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1 Multistape Poker-Simultanious-Move
We first consider asimple $\mathrm{n}$-round poker. Each of two players Iand Ireceives ahand $\mathrm{x}$
and $\mathrm{y}$ , respectively, in [0,0. according to auniform distribution, and chooses one of two
alternatives Reject or Accept If $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\cdot\cdot \mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}$ is R-R,the game proceeds to the next round
and both players are dealt new hands $\mathrm{x}$ and $\mathrm{y}$ . If the choice-pair is A-A showdown occurs
and the game ends with $1^{?}\mathrm{s}$ reward $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{n}(\mathrm{x}-\mathrm{y})$ . If players choose different choices,
$\mathrm{p}$
$(\overline{\mathrm{p}})$ . This zer0-sum game is played in $\mathrm{n}$-rounds, and player I(II)aims to maximize
Each of two players must make one choice among two. Players know that arbitration
comes in, if their choices are different, and the arbitration is not necessarily fair.
Arbitration is made at most in $\mathrm{n}$ times, within which the final decision must be reached.
Most of papers $[’1,2\beta,5\mathrm{J}$ analyse amodel where arbitration is absent, or fair even if it
comes in. We consider in the present article and $\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}.[\acute{4},6,7]$ aversion of arbitration
problemes with active and unfair arbitrator who is under the influence of the relative powor
of the players.
$m$ Mathematics subject classifica $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}$ . $62\mathrm{L}15$, $\infty \mathrm{C}39$, $\Re \mathrm{D}40$
Keywords and phrases. Optimal stopping game, poker, optimal strategy
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Let $\phi_{n^{(\lambda)}}(\mathrm{t}_{\acute{\eta}}(\mathrm{t}))$ be the probability that player I(II)chooses Aon the hand x(f).
Also let $\mathrm{v}_{t\iota}$ be the value (for 1)of the $\mathrm{n}$-round game. Then we have
(1.1)






(1.2) $\mathrm{M}_{\dot{\mathrm{h}}}(\mathrm{x},\mathrm{y})=$ $A|\approx$ $\{\begin{array}{lll}v_{h-|} \overline{\mathrm{P}}^{\mathrm{S}_{\dot{f}}\mathrm{n}[\mathrm{X}-])*} \dot{P}^{1\Gamma_{\mathrm{n}-|}}\mathfrak{p}_{J}\zeta \mathfrak{n}(\lambda-\mathrm{t})+\overline{\mathrm{p}}r_{\hslash-|} \end{array}\}$
$\zeta\theta^{\eta(\lambda-j]}$






$\eta$ $(\phi, \Psi )$, with
(1.4) $\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{b}}(\phi_{J}\psi)\equiv \mathrm{F}-[(^{-}(\overline{r}, (\mathrm{f})$ $(\mathrm{s}\wp(\mathrm{x}-\mathrm{J})-\mathrm{v}_{\eta-\mathrm{t}})\{$ $\mathrm{o}|^{2}$ $\overline{|\mathfrak{p}}]$
$\mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{t}}\overline{\},}\{\mathrm{f})^{\mathrm{T}}]$
$–\mathrm{F}-[(\grave{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{n}(\tau_{-}-\eta.)_{\mathrm{n}-|)(\mathrm{P}[\mathrm{f}\dagger\overline{\mathrm{P}}^{i}\gamma)]}-\gamma^{-}$ ,
where $4_{\mathrm{h}}\mathrm{t}\iota$ ) and $*_{?\backslash }(f )$ in (1.1)-(1.2) are abreviated by $\oint$ and $\Psi$. We repeatedly
use this simplification throughout this paper.
function of $\mathrm{p}6[_{\mathrm{Z}^{l}}^{[perp]}\mathrm{I}]$ , convex and $j\mathfrak{n}i\mathrm{r}\rho \mathrm{a}\mathit{5}$ .
$\underline{1\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{p}=|/\mathrm{z}$ $\mathrm{t}\underline{\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{n}}--/^{1}\mathrm{Z}$ and $\mathrm{v}_{1},--0$ , $\forall \mathrm{n}\geq|$ .
$\underline{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{p}--1$ , $\underline{\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{a}-[perp]\wedge\dagger 1^{-}l(\dot{1}_{\eta}\dagger q^{1})(\underline{\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}.,}\underline{\mathrm{M}\mathrm{o}\underline{\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{f}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{L}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}})$ $\underline{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\mathrm{v}_{n}=\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{h}}^{\mathrm{T}_{-}}$
In Table 1the values of the game for various $\mathrm{p}$ and $\mathrm{n}$ are given
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$\mathfrak{n}$ $=|$ 0. $\overline{\mathrm{b}}$ 0, $\theta s^{-}$ $\rho,\overline{\}}$ 0. $lS^{arrow}$ $\mathit{0},\zeta$






$l.\prime \mathrm{D}\mathrm{t}?\zeta os^{1}|?o?\forall L$ $\mathit{1}\prime b^{(f}-?\mathrm{b}bl+2$
. 1720 ’ $iq\zeta 3$ ’. $(\}\zeta 3\dot{\Psi}$
$\backslash \mathrm{b}\mathit{3}$ bo $\backslash$ $2_{-}\uparrow 7$ $l$ $.7^{\mathrm{I}fl7}$ , $s\pi$ $\int$
. $3\grave{\downarrow}\mathfrak{l}\uparrow$ ,$.\eta\eta \mathit{4}1$ .6 $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{P}$




We investigate in this section the bilateral-move variant of the poker discussed in the
previous section. ’Players act not simultaniously but $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y},\underline{\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}}$, player Iacts first
and then player $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}$ acts, after knowing his rival’s choice of either $\mathrm{R}$ or A. Denote this n-
round poker by $\mathrm{G}_{\hslash}$ , and Jet $\mathrm{w}_{\mathfrak{n}}$ be the value of Gn, The game would be conveniently
described by
——\sim --
$\mathrm{h}\mathrm{t}$ $*_{\mathrm{n}^{(\chi)}}$ be the probability that I $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ Awhen his hand is $\mathrm{x}$ . Also let $\dot{\gamma}_{\mathrm{R}\mathfrak{n}}(f)$
$(\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{h}}}l\mathrm{J})$
$)\mathrm{k}$ the probability that $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ A when his hand is $\mathrm{y}$ and his rival,s
choice has been (A). The expected payoff to Iwhen players use the strategy{riple $\phi_{\mathit{7}1}-$
$._{\mathrm{R}\mathrm{r}}\sim\gamma_{\mathrm{A}n}$ is
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(2.1) $\mathrm{M}_{n^{(\phi t_{\mathrm{R}^{y}}\forall_{\acute{\mathrm{A}}})=\in}},\nwarrow$ $[^{-}\nu_{h-|}\overline{*}\overline{_{1\backslash }}\dagger \mathfrak{b}^{w_{\mathrm{n}\lrcorner}^{-}+\overline{\mathrm{I}^{0;\prime}}\mu^{[\lambda}2}..$ $1)\overline{\phi}\Psi_{\mathrm{B}}$
$+(1’:p^{(\lambda}\gamma\}\overline{\mathrm{F}}l\psi_{t-1},)\phi^{(}\overline{r}_{\mathrm{A}}+\sigma_{2^{\mathrm{r}\mathfrak{i}\mathrm{x}\gamma)*\dot{\psi}_{h}}}]$
$–\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{b}-\mathrm{I}}+\mathrm{E}[(\dot{)}\Psi^{\dot{(}\chi-\mathrm{J})-\mathrm{W}_{\cap-1}^{-})}\{_{\nabla\neq}-\mathfrak{t}\overline{\gamma}(\overline{\phi}\psi_{\mathrm{R}}r*\mathrm{t}t_{\mathrm{A}})\}]$ ,





The Optimality Equation we want to discuss is
The value $\mathrm{w}_{\wedge}$ of the game $\mathrm{G}_{\hslash}$
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\theta\theta \mathrm{f}\dot{1}S$ vn\\‘I\mbox{\boldmath $\theta$}eA ,
$[\mathrm{e},\mathrm{f}$. $(_{!\tau l})$ is $\mathrm{w}_{\infty-}.--[1-(\frac{\sqrt{S}--1}{\sim-^{\mathrm{Z}}})^{V_{\mathrm{L}}}]/[^{\vee}\mathrm{I}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}arrow(\frac{r_{F-[perp]}}{\mathrm{z}})^{\acute{|}}\mathrm{z}]=-’.0.1\mathrm{I}?7$ .
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$\underline{\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}4}$. The solution to the game for $\mathrm{p}--$
$‘ r$
$\underline{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}}$ A $(\mathrm{R})$, $\underline{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}}\mathrm{x}>(<)_{\mathrm{Z}}[perp](_{1+}\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{b}-\mathrm{I}})’,$ ’
recursion
$(\mathrm{n}\geq 1 ; \mathrm{w}_{\vee^{\backslash }}=0)$
$)$
disadvantage for the first-mover which is unavoidable from leaking some information
about his private hand $\mathrm{x}$ , does not increase to its extreme and stops at an intermediate
point by making askillful bluff.
Computation of the values which appear in Theorem 3is shown in Table 2.
$\mathrm{c}_{n}$
0. $\mathrm{p}g_{2_{-}^{\ell\}}}$
1 0. zszl $\zeta_{\grave{j}}.?3\mathrm{b}.\forall^{-}$ C. $27\uparrow \mathit{3}$ $-\dot{[}_{\acute{\mathit{1}}\vee}.r_{1}\uparrow \mathit{3}\mathrm{b}$ . $\mathrm{S}\iota 7\mathit{9}$
3 . $ll\mathit{2}$ ? . ?3 $l+$ . 3 $\mathrm{z}\mathit{3}7$ $-0.l\mathit{0}0+$ $\cdot$ $\sigma_{\iota’)}.\cdot.60$
4 . $2^{1}\backslash ,P_{1}1$ .’? $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{q}\zeta$ . $33\Gamma$ ? $-g_{\acute{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{f}’+\mathrm{I}}$. , $||$ $7^{\zeta}\mathrm{z}$
$\zeta\zeta$ ’. $\tau_{21+\forall}\sim \mathrm{I}{}_{\overline{\mathrm{J}}_{d}}P\neg$ .. $\mathrm{Q}_{-}^{\urcorner},?3\eta \mathrm{z}\mathit{8}^{\zeta}$ $..\mathit{3}^{(}\succ \mathrm{I}\mathrm{Z}3*3$? $-_{4}\cap \mathrm{I}|\eta\{-J.\mathrm{f}\mathrm{I}P\zeta$ $\backslash \eta q0\mathit{3}$$./l?S$ $|$
$\eta$ . 2143 . $r_{\mathfrak{l}u\downarrow}$ . $y’*\zeta D$ $-^{\iota}\mathrm{J}.|\mathfrak{l}\uparrow$ $2$ . $’\}_{\acute{i}^{\lambda l}},$) $0$
$e$ .2 $|4’..$) . $r_{i^{\mathfrak{l}}-\rho 0}$, .5 $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{Y}6$ -0. I $\downarrow f\zeta$ $.\uparrow fff\zeta$
$\mathrm{q}$ . $\mathrm{Z}\downarrow 3\uparrow$ $.\cdot\urcorner‘ \mathit{2}\tilde{\mathrm{C}}’0$ . $S+\zeta\Re$ $-\Gamma!t\mathfrak{l}d-\tau l$ .) $\hat{\mathrm{y}}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{J}$
/0
$.\cdot-$
) I $3\uparrow$ . $\cdot’\grave{\mathit{1}}^{\underline{7}}\Psi^{l}0$ -0. $[\mathfrak{l}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}$ $\eta$. $3*\dot{s}\uparrow$ .? $Pl2$
$l$ $/$ . $\vee\sim t\neg.\gamma\rho\backslash$ . $/t\not\subset P\mathit{0}$ . $S^{(t\tilde{\mathrm{J}}\uparrow}$ $-\theta,t$ $|^{\mathit{0}_{1}}$ $7$ . $|\mathrm{I}P62$:
$\llcorner_{|1l\backslash \mathrm{i}\dot{\mathrm{r}}}^{-}$ 0. $2|37$ $\mathit{0}.\uparrow zPO$ $\mathit{0}.\mathit{3}\not\in b\mathit{0}$ $-o$. $ll\mathrm{q}\gamma$ $\mathit{0}’.\mathit{1}\mathit{9}l$ $\mathrm{Z}$
$–\mathrm{R}_{J}\underline{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{m}_{-}\underline{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{k}_{-},2_{-}$ . When $\mathrm{p}--1$ the game valu$\mathrm{e}$ $\mathrm{w}_{\eta}$ is equal to the game value $\mathrm{v}_{\eta}$ in the




From Theorem 2we show acomputation of the solution of the bilateral poker for pu
0.55 (0.8)in Table 3(4) for very small $\mathrm{n}$ . It is instructive to compare these values
with those appearing in Tables 1and 2. (Tabks 3 $\mathrm{c}\iota \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}+\mathrm{q}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{D}\}\mathrm{b}|.\sigma \mathrm{d}.$ ).
Theorem 2gives aresult that if $\mathrm{P}=0.6$ , then
$Y_{\mathfrak{y}}=^{[perp]}+$ ’
$\mathrm{b}_{\eta}--[perp].\mathrm{z}$ , $\mathrm{a}_{\eta}=.\frac{3}{r}$ , $\mathrm{w}_{n}--0$, for all $\mathrm{n}\succ 1/\cdot$
This implies that the disadvantage for $\mathrm{I}$ , which is inevitable due to his
$\iota$ tmoving-first”
di sappears if $\mathrm{p}=0.6$ .
The values of bilateral poker for various $\mathrm{p}\dot{\in}[^{[perp]_{z_{J}}}|]$ are compared in.Figure 2.
$-\tau\infty\Leftrightarrow\simeq \mathrm{h}^{-}\mathrm{F}_{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}2$.Values of bilateral poker for various $\mathrm{p}$
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